



Building International and Regional Consensus

Policy Dialogue Report No. 4 South Africa's Relations with Zimbabwe

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SPEAKERS:

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Dr Martin Rupiya (Director, African Public Policy & Research Institute)

Keynote speaker: Professor Adam Habib (Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg)

Introduction

On 17 November 2010 the Southern African Liaison Office (SALO) convened a 'Building International and Regional Consensus Policy Dialogue' at the University of Johannesburg. The session explored various aspects of South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe, lessons from South Africa's transition experience, and how South Africa and the international community can best support sustainable reconstruction in Zimbabwe. The meeting corresponded to a forthcoming publication by SALO of a three-year research project looking at South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe.

It also revisited a topic that was, in part, the basis of SALO's original mandate, and which has continued to be discussed at length in SALO-hosted forums. As **Venetia Govender** recalled, SALO initially focused on how to

“ensure that the link and the relationship [between South Africa and Zimbabwe] was one based on solidarity, was one based on mutual respect, on the application of human rights, both [in] South Africa and Zimbabwe.”



These 'noble intentions' still form the basis for SALO's work, yet the reality and difficulties in the relationship between the two countries have also become evident over that time.

Diamonds

This complex relationship can be seen very clearly by looking at the issue of natural resources – particularly diamonds. Govender stated that the relationship between the two countries is 'not just a state-to-state relationship [with] regards to mineral resources', but there are also business relationships at stake that largely cloud the political interactions. Govender posited that the issue of

“mineral resources brings together the nexus between the political and the economic in the most vivid form in the way it influences the way power is exercised and the way South Africa mediates or what positions it takes up or the issues it raises.”

That is, political interactions are largely coloured by South Africa's economic interests in Zimbabwe. Foreign buyers of natural resources like Mwana Africa, Metallon, Zimplats, Anglo, Rio Tinto are mostly based in South Africa with South African shareholders. This means that the South African government must tread carefully.

Govender stated that the Marange diamonds had served as a litmus test for the Government of National Unity (GNU), and the lack of any real reform and transparency in relation to diamonds had served to highlight the GNU's ineffectiveness.

The same parties are often involved in both the political and economic spheres. Their economic interests rest in maintaining the status quo which allows them to freely exploit the natural resources and garner extensive economic power. This, in turn, severely curtails their interest in and ability to speak out against undemocratic institutions or those that do not promote human rights.

The role that diamonds could play in the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans is substantial, yet the country is unable to fully make use of the resources:

“[W]hen you engage with the Zimbabwe Mineral and Development Corporation ... they can’t at this stage even give you a full list of who owns what concessions in the Marange fields and when those concessions were bought, on what basis the shareholding is.”

Equally concerning are reports such as this one:

“Tendai Biti said very recently that in the last sale of diamonds \$45 million was realised from that sale [but] the state only got \$15 million of that, the rest of the \$30 million we are not sure where it went to, but we are sure it went to private companies.”

The feeling is that ‘the political forces are not that much in control’, rather the securocrats are actually controlling the resources, and the situation of foreign business interests is enhanced by this lack of clarity and control. A critical issue then is the

“illegality of the mineral resources ... the illegality that is run not done by outside illegal agents but by the state, by surrogates of the state and agencies of the state.”

Not only are the benefits from Zimbabwe’s natural resources not being shared with the people, but worse, ‘Mugabe’s regime is able to make use of these seemingly limitless resources to maintain its grip on power.’

In conclusion, Govender identified a lack of clear, useable information from Zimbabwe as a major problem. While there is information available from the Kimberley Process documentation, it is technical and

“not the kind of information I would want as an activist ... I need the kind of information that enables me to participate, it’s not simply there, the role and responsibility of my own country ... and as a citizen it’s not clear for all to see.”

She suggested that

“our pressure point should shift a little bit to SA [as it is] a lot safer and we have access to information networks. We should now begin to use some of those tools [we have] to understand the Zimbabwe situation a little better with regards to minerals.”

In response Ms. Henry (Foreign Service Officer: Directorate of Economic Development; Chief Directorate: Economic and Social Affairs) argued that the Kimberley Process was an effective

mechanism in regulating the trade of diamonds within and from Zimbabwe. She also noted the South African government had worked closely with the Kimberley Process. Ms. Henry said:

“it [Kimberley Process] does encourage transparency and accountability and it does this through its peer mechanism review through the annual reports, it also encourages efforts towards transparency and economic accountability including sending a recent review mission to Zimbabwe, and our Director General Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba has also spoken to the press quite openly.”

2011 elections and lessons from South Africa’s transition



Dr. Judy Smith-Hohn from the Institute for Security Studies addressed the issue of possible elections in 2011 noting that:

“the key political players are sending mixed messages about whether they can and should be held and on the other hand the analysts are saying that the conditions haven’t been met and that there is a lack of progress on all these fronts and there should be an initial delay until conditions have become more favourable for such a process.”

She sought to highlight the possible scenarios that may play out with regards to elections in Zimbabwe. She hinted that it was ironic that elections had been declared despite delays in the constitution-making process:

“Basically the question is: How likely is it that elections will take place next year despite the delays we have seen in the constitution-making process? For example given that it is actually supposed to precede the electoral process. We also know that Robert Mugabe has been known to renege on prior agreements. We remember that the March 2008 elections were unilaterally declared [on] that particular date. What’s the likelihood that he will do that again and also of course he is reported to have stated that the lifespan of the GPA is ending in February, that elections should be held in March, there are [then] very crucial reasons why we should be thinking what those scenarios might look like.”

The South African Presidency in particular has an important role to play in the elections, continuing to engage with the Zimbabwean principals in trying to help them find a solution on such contentious issues.

She shared three possible scenarios to help policy-makers think through the possible ways in which they can interact with Zimbabwe ahead of the possible elections in 2011:

- **Scenario 1: Elections are held following the full implementation of the GPA.**

Scenario 1 'is the most ideal situation' but unfortunately unlikely to take place. For it to occur:

"we need to assume that the principals through the transitional arrangement have come to an agreement on the most important of those outstanding issues ... in other words they have agreed and approved the key government appointments; they have allocated vacant positions to designated individuals; they have resolved the issue of sanctions in one way or the other; and then we can also then further assume that this process is taking place under the new Constitution. That is the ideal situation. In this best case scenario, of course the international donor community would readily pledge technical and other support for such an election. SADC as a guarantor of the GPA and South Africa as its designated facilitator could then provide additional support, but they could also mark this occasion as a victory for international intervention, so to say, as sort of providing an African solution to an African problem. Electoral observers would be posted well before the event, we would have long term and short term electoral observations, and then that would ensure the preparations run smoothly and without violence and intimidation. Many believe that such a scenario would bring about the victory of the MDC. Now not only those MDC supporters think that but also those I would like to refer to as anti-transitionalists are well aware of this danger. And since we also know that currently they are reluctant to accept such a win there is a real probability of the violence and intimidation that we saw in 2008; particularly given the history of violence in several other elections that we saw in the past. So, even then if we still maintain the optimistic approach, and even then if the MDC should win, how certain can we be that the security sector, most importantly the members of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and other hardliners within ZANU-PF, will accept the political and economic uncertainty that such an outcome will pose for their futures? So the outcome of that - even if it starts off very positively - we still see that in the end, inevitably it brings about a very high [degree of] uncertainty."

- **Scenario 2: Elections are held in 2011 without the full implementation of the GPA.**

Unfortunately, 'this is of course a much more likely scenario, one that ... I think many of us dread.' Smith-Hohn acknowledged that although there would still be a possibility for legitimate elections to occur under scenario 2, 'it will certainly be difficult for the international community to pledge support' for the process. She said that in this scenario:

"electoral observation will most likely be restricted to only allow the presence of certain regional and continental bodies, and again there is a high probability of violence as anti-transitionalists apply the same tactics of intimidation of support of ZANU-PF as they did in

2008. More importantly regardless of whether the MDC emerges victorious or not, and given the uncompromising attitude ZANU-PF has had ever since it signed the power-sharing pact, the latter will clearly not accept an electoral defeat. So we might therefore again see a repeat of a negotiation process which would ultimately lead to a new transitional arrangement between the major parties.”

This scenario would therefore continue to foster uncertainty in the country. In both scenarios 1 and 2, the outcomes also depend largely ‘on the behaviour of the security sector’ in the election process and accepting the results, which we have seen in 2008 does not necessarily produce positive results:

“For as long as the set of actors don’t have a viable alternative source of income or some guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for wrongs committed against the population and in support of ZANU-PF, it’s highly improbable that they will not do what’s in their power to sabotage a sustainable transitional process which would ultimately have very little room for them. So there is certainly no easy answer or blue print strategy [for] dealing with the set of actors, and it’s surely a process that requires a lot of attention, but the price for not addressing this crucial aspect is continued uncertainty and we need to be aware of that.”

- **Scenario 3: Elections are delayed and there is no full implementation of the GPA.**

This scenario would actually reflect a recognition that the conditions for convening elections in a climate conducive to free and fair elections have not been met, and therefore the elections cannot take place.

The parties in this scenario will doubtfully resolve the major outstanding issues on the table, but by postponing the elections ‘it will allow some time to make headway on other issues’ including the drafting of the Constitution, conducting a land audit, and addressing the need for security transformation, among other issues.

While there are a number of things that make scenario 3 less likely, the desire by Robert Mugabe to ‘want to organise and preferably declare elections at the earliest most likely date so that he can reinforce his party’s hold on power’ before he is off the political scene is probably the most critical. In Smith-Hohn’s opinion,

“in this final scenario it matters less if the GPA is fully implemented or not because essentially what has been happening is that time has been bought and it is time that is really required”,

in order to make headway on important and necessary processes such as security transformation, land audit, and similar progressive reforms.

Acknowledging the difficulties in making comparisons between South Africa and Zimbabwe's transitions, Smith-Hohn believed that there are some lessons to be learnt, because the transition in South Africa was brought about through a careful negotiation process between two parties who were inherently mistrustful of each other.

Reminding the audience that:

“...there are three possible outcomes of any transition: it can either lead to an installation of democracy, it can also lead to a return of authoritarian rule or it can lead to some sort of emergence of a revolutionary alternative”,

she highlighted two main lessons that could be valuable in helping Zimbabwe transition from ‘that form of authoritarian rule to some form of electoral democracy.’

The first is that we need to understand elections as an inherently conflictual process which exacerbates existing tensions in an already divided society. In South Africa in the 1990's:

“there was a delay of elections which then allowed for an improvement of the relations between the adversaries, there has been no sense of that time in Zimbabwe ... by the time elections were held in South Africa the confidence building processes undertaken during the negotiation process had begun to bear fruit, the parties had begun to trust each other, at least some of them, we are not saying that there weren't other people who were trying to sabotage but at least some key players had begun to trust one another and political forces had collaborated, there had been some forms of collaboration in order to have that sense of trust so as to decrease the likelihood of contested elections really.”

However, South Africa's experience points to a number of other conditions which facilitated the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Most importantly, the parties were willing to explore a negotiated settlement as an alternative to ending the conflict - the liberation movements and the apartheid government realised that a proactive engagement in the negotiation process would allow them to lead that particular process.

The second lesson that could be useful from South Africa's experience is that

“the governing elite had undergone a pragmatic shift in mindset, and they had realised that the status quo was no longer sustainable ... and also they realised that there was some sort of need for structural reform. While these parties went into this thinking they could lead the process and eventually emerge victorious, it doesn't really matter in that sense because that mind set was there.”

These lessons should be kept in mind as South Africa and other international and regional actors engage with Zimbabwe, and support should be given to help these pre-conditions emerge.

The role of civil society and the international community

Civil society and the international community have largely had their fears confirmed that the GPA 'would be ultimately a deal between elites, that would leave Zimbabwean people out,' according to **Sisonke Msimang**. The rhetoric has focused people's attention on the wrong issues, while leaving out the more fundamental questions of human rights and equality. Msimang asserted:



"Somehow everyone has been captured by the language of the political process of this GPA, so that when we talk about these outstanding issues, we talk about them as if they really mean anything. So the MDC will threaten with seriousness, with real anger, to pull out of the GNU because of the outstanding issues, and the outstanding issues are: ambassadorial appointments! As if an ordinary Zimbabwean in Masvingo cares about who is the ambassador at the UN! What does it actually really matter?"

And more importantly, perhaps, is the issue of why civil society has responded to these 'completely and thoroughly inconsequential' outstanding matters, legitimising them and neglecting to push for the real issues to be put on the table:

"But the fact that we have spoken about them so vociferously means that we have been truly captured by this discourse about the GPA and GNU, and whereas typically, civil society stands outside the fray and continues to shout, on behalf of people, on behalf of principles, on behalf of values."

The role of the international community also needs to be reflected on, and how in many ways wider intervention is hamstrung by the role of SADC. Msimang reported that in several advocacy visits to the UN and US this year they were:

"told flat out that in Zimbabwe we were waiting for blood, because in fact there is no role for the international community unless there is absolute chaos in Zimbabwe. So we wait for an emergency. Right. Because the space has been crowded out for any dealings in Zimbabwe by SADC ... I think ... we need to stop being insane about this notion that SADC will ever solve the problem. Because I think it's clear that SADC has not come to the party when it comes to Zimbabwe in any meaningful way."

Msimang observed that the challenge lay in diplomatically pointing out to the South African government, 'the guarantors of this process' on the basis of their mediation role in Zimbabwe, that they 'haven't done a good job'. She argued:

"I think that there is a nice way and polite way of trying to pull the political process that SADC currently manages away from SADC because it's absolutely necessary and we have seen in the last few years that where there has been action, concerted and significant action around Zimbabwe, it has been where the AU has been involved ... [T]he reality is that South Africa has this schizophrenic relationship with its neighbours and a schizophrenic foreign policy, sort of persona ... And I think there is a real case to be made, for making sure that South Africa is able to fix the problems happening in the neighbourhood if it's going to be able to operate at the level of the Security Council and so on and so forth in the same way that Nigeria is operating in ECOWAS ... [Y]ou need Africans who are not aligned to Zimbabwe in the same way to act in a significant manner ... Because this whole process of the GPA came from the AU, I think we will be well within our rights as civil society actors to begin to say we need to put this thing back on the agenda at the next Heads of State summit which is taking place. We are actively working on that. Whether or not that will be in concert with the South African actors, I think civil society needs to begin to make a strong case."

South Africa's foreign policy options in relation to the transition government in Zimbabwe



Dr Martin Rupiya talked about the necessity of 'pragmatic policy options' in relation to South Africa-Zimbabwe relations instead of emotive policy approaches and decisions. "[T]he discussion on Zimbabwe always turns to be emotional. In the end, sometimes you cannot even develop pragmatic policy options."

South Africa's foreign policy approach to Zimbabwe can be difficult to ascertain because of the nature of Zimbabwe's fragmented GNU. Borrowing Ms Msimang's term Dr Rupiya called such a fragmentation 'schizophrenic':

"The first is of course to understand the whole concept of foreign policy. I think it was my colleague Sisonke who mentioned the word schizophrenic. Foreign policy at the best of times resonates between domestic and foreign interests of a particular state. In the case

of Zimbabwe, the South Africans in crafting foreign policy are in fact faced with a schizophrenic constituency.”

This issue was also compounded by an observation that the GNU itself did not have a unified and coherent foreign policy framework:

“I have a small case study which demonstrates that the transitional government is in fact divided. The two main parties rather. One interesting case study, which touches on the international dimension, is the relations that were attempted to be struck between South Korea and North Korea and Zimbabwe. It was interesting. The office of the Prime Minister had worked, put together a bilateral agreement, BIPPA. They had signed a BIPPA in November with South Africa. They then crafted a BIPPA which had been negotiated by the previous government before this transitional government. So the final touches were in fact simply put into place. When that BIPPA was then signed, during the visit of the Prime Minister to South Korea, the other part of government then disowned that particular arrangement. So that’s the real schizophrenia around the foreign policy for you. Now, what does South Africa relate? Whom do they relate to? The one faction is of course banging the drum on Pyongyang or North Korea, and the other is trying to open up to South Korea. It presents real challenges for South Africa to begin to then relate to the transitional government.”

In light of the inconsistency of Zimbabwean foreign policy, Dr Rupiya hinted at the need for a pragmatic approach in dealing with the GNU, one that was cognisant of the divisions within the transitional government: ‘[s]o the point is that you have different constituencies to which South African foreign policy must respond’.

SADC had an important role to play with regards to the Zimbabwean crisis and could not be disregarded. Dr Rupiya asserted the importance of both regional and international co-operation in the reconstruction of Zimbabwe:

“I really want stress this point that if we are going to see a resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe, we cannot discount the role of SADC. In fact we need to find some sort of convergence on what Habib did raise between the international community and SADC as they respond to the crisis in Zimbabwe. In other words, where ... Obama sits, working very closely with SADC and dealing day-to-day, hand-to-hand on the question in Zimbabwe”.

Dr Rupiya added that: ‘whatever foreign policy South Africa comes up with, it has to resonate with the people of Zimbabwe’. In concluding his presentation he said:

“I don’t think we can begin to discount and dismiss SADC. There is still a role for the region and I think it is true that we need to find a convergence between the international

community, the regional players, who will then engage very quietly, but very firmly with the local actors so that at the end of the day, we impact very positively on the lives and situations of the ordinary Zimbabweans”.

Reflections of the prerequisites for a sustainable reconstruction of Zimbabwe

Recognising that discussing Zimbabwe is particularly emotionally charged in South Africa for a number of reasons, the BIC’s keynote speaker **Professor Adam Habib** spoke to the audience about five critical prerequisites that are needed for sustainable reconstruction in Zimbabwe, and the role that South Africa, the region and international actors can play.

Firstly,

“any solution in Zimbabwe has to begin from a political settlement, which has at its core what Garth Le Pere has suggested is defined by transitional justice, national healing and reconciliation.”



As articulated by Mahmood Mamdani, a situation like Zimbabwe requires ‘survivor’s justice’. As Habib explains, it is a notion that is depicted as a counter to ‘western forms of justice’, largely defined in Nuremberg, where effectively the victors define the terms of justice, and the losers are penalised far more harshly. There is an alternative survivor’s model of justice that has emerged on the African continent; two particular examples are South Africa and Mozambique.

Essentially in both cases the belligerent parties were brought together, they were forced to engage with each other ... and in both cases they formed a solution - a kind of political compromise, and that political compromise became the hallmark for the reconstruction of that society. Recalling examples from South Africa, Habib said the important thing to remember is that there is a danger of taking things too far, and that

“you can only temper justice if peace is its dividend. There is only legitimacy in the tempering of justice if peace is the dividend. Without peace and progress, there can be no legitimacy to the tempering of justice”.

A measure of pragmatism is often needed in order to find solutions to the political crisis that often accompany the transitional phase of many countries.

“So for me the question is: there’s a level of pragmatism to find a solution to any political conflict, that pragmatism has to come to the fore. But that pragmatism can only be

legitimate if the trade off is peace, if the trade off is not peace then what have you traded? You have traded justice for nothing in return. And the second thing is there has to be consequences, they might not be legal, you may not get what you really wanted in having someone thrown in jail, but there must be some consequences.”

The effect of such consequences would be to deter disregard for citizen’s rights.

Habib went on to talk about how measures such as article 16 of the Rome Statute could be used as a form of ‘consequence’ for the abuse of citizen’s rights, as they require for the offending party to apply for a waiver from persecution every year.

Secondly,

“it is worth bearing in mind that the reason Zimbabwe is in its current predicament is because pragmatism prevailed over principle at the dawn of this transition. At the dawn of this transition you had the sacrifice of socio-economic justice and that was most dramatically reflected in the land question being sacrificed [at] Lancaster House, and it was postponed until a future date so as not to rock the political boat. Now, in the desire to effect political compromise, both political and economical elites - national and foreign - were willing to sacrifice equitable development; and this, by the way, was at the advice of mainstream political science - not only, dare I say, American political science, but it seems to have become much more global over the last three decades ... The advice to democratise is simple: stay away from issues of economic justice for they will complicate the transition. Then when you raise issues of economic justice, reformers in the regime don’t want to make the deal, and you don’t create the middle ground for reformers both in the state and the liberation parties to come together and concoct a political settlement. The advice to would-be democratisers is: take formal democracy, focus on procedural democracy because the alternative is authoritarian states, and if you don’t take formal democracy you will get nothing at all. The net effect of this choice in Zimbabwe was that two decades after the dawn of independence that inequitable settlement at the dawn of that transition was manipulated by political elites and in particular by Robert Mugabe. It was manipulated by Robert Mugabe in a way that undermined the sustainability of procedural democracy in itself. So the logic of the theory, the logic of mainstream political science of the last three decades, is: make the deal, forget about socio-economic justice - and by the way it was exactly the kind of a deal that was mooted here. Forget about socio-economic justice, that will complicate matters, just make the deal. But when you do that, you create pressures, you create a polarization, you create the inequities within the society that come to haunt you. And then the very people who made the deal, then manipulate that deal, manipulate the rights’ discourse to stay in power, and if you just listen to the rhetoric of Robert Mugabe post-1999, it is the rhetoric of manipulating the issue of justice and the issue of rights to stay in power, and this lesson it seems to me

needs to be borne in mind. It underscores the need not only to simply review the redistribution programme, but to reorganise and revitalize it so that it spreads out to the vast majority of Zimbabweans. It seems to me that similar lessons need to be applied in other sectors: ownership of mineral resources should be similarly diversified and not be overly concentrated in foreign hands whether they be western or Asian, it seems to me - or South African for that matter as well. That's a fair point given South Africa's investment."

Thirdly, Professor Habib emphasised the necessity for a combination of a market-based economy with a planned economy. However, there is 'a huge tension between advocates of the market and state-oriented policy solutions.' Habib, unsurprised, said that:

"given the current lack of capacity in state institutions and the ideological predispositions of international political elites and multilateral institutions whose foreign resources are definitely going to be required. State solutions on their own are unlikely to be feasible, but unfettered market solutions are also dangerous because they have a danger of reproducing historical inequities, and so what you are going to need is the flowering of the market, but you are also going to have the conditioning of the market by the state. And that by the way has been the experience of all developmental agendas whether from South East Asia to Western Europe to even the famous African case studies of Botswana, even Mozambique. That there is a mix between market and planned, a mix between market and state, there is a level of that, and it seems to me that it's absolutely crucial for progressives both in state and outside state and particularly in civil society to defend the right of Zimbabweans to have both market and state in its reconstruction effort. There is a fairly powerful lobby particularly in South Africa that ... constantly raises the issue of [how] the state must be left out of all solutions, and that it's simply a market reconstruction agenda, and I think that could be a very dangerous case. And so the defence must be for both market, and the regulation of the market towards nationally ensconced and national development agendas."

He pointed out the necessity for a nationally ensconced and diversified economy in Zimbabwe with 'domestic dominance of the nation's resources as the defining feature of Zimbabwe's reconstruction programme.'

"Zimbabwe is never going to be able to reconstruct without a significant amount or mobilisation of resources. Some of that can be domestic, some of that will be regional, but a fair amount of that has to come from outside the continent. And so broadly you are going to need foreign resources, you are going to need foreign skills, and you are going to need foreign expertise. So the principals have to be applied pragmatically, but these principals need not rely or entail a complete reliance on the free market and the abandonment of the goal of a nationally ensconced but diversified ownership of the

nation's resources. Remember I made it very clear - nationally ensconced but diversified; I did not say state dominance of those resources. I said diversified and nationally ensconced, and it has to be applied relatively pragmatically given the need for foreign resources and skills, etc."

Fourthly, Habib reminded the audience that reconstruction requires both aid and trade. Some like Greg Mills believe that 'aid is bad and what you need to do is trade, [and] that what you need to do to replace aid with is to simply trade, and reconstruction will happen.' Habib said that while

"there's a measure of truth in it, but I think the problem with those reflections is [that] they only take one part of the equation not the other. It seems to me that any seriously constructive agenda requires both aid and trade. The great success stories of post-World War II development were Europe, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Let me just give you some data in this regard; in all by the way, I would argue you had the mix of aid and trade, and also the mix of state and market. But let me give you the numbers, obviously in the Western European case you had the Marshall Plan, of course this is well known, without the Marshall Plan you wouldn't have had the resources for the reconstruction of Europe. In the Asian countries and this is in UNCATD's 2007 Economic Development of Africa, [which] estimates that Japan received 500 million dollars per annum from the US between 1950 and 1970, that's effectively 10 billion in 20 years ... in dollars [based on] 1950's figures. Korea received economic aid and military investment that amounted to \$13 billion and Taiwan (small Taiwan) received \$ 5,6 billion. But in all of those cases trade was as crucial as aid. So what the US did is it gave all three countries preferential treatment access to its markets for both Western Europe and its Asian allies. Moreover, it did not demand reciprocal access, enabling these societies to develop competitive capacities before they integrated into the world economy. This restructuring of international trade by the U.S. in favour of its allies was crucial for the development of both Western Europe and South East Asia in the post-World War II period. And the lesson for Zimbabwe is that a mix of aid and trade is going to be required if the country is going to succeed in getting out of its economic malaise."

For sustainable reconstruction in Zimbabwe to be successful it would entail the use of foreign aid to reinforce Zimbabwe's international trade. A number of countries attempting to reconstruct within a post-conflict context made use of foreign aid in order to rebuild their economies.

Lastly, Habib emphasised that equitable development in the current global context requires as a condition, for sustainable reconstruction, democratic accountability. In this sense Amartya Sen is correct to argue that political freedom, real democracy is necessary for economic growth and development.

There is a need to go beyond the 'formal procedural elements of democracy' which don't necessarily lead to the 'pluralisation of power that should be the core substantive function of democracies itself.'

"But if you simply look at the democratisation literature of the last decade you'll see there is a concern about the notion of illiberal democracies and delegative democracies, these democracies whose form is present but the substantive aspect of democracy, accountability, the pluralisation of power, citizen's interest - if all of those kinds of things are missing, then what you have is a democracy in which elites maintain control and they simply have the procedural forms and institutions in place without any of the substantive consequences that is meant to flow from that."

It is important to remember that

"development happens because politics happens, development happens because ... power is constructed either in the international or domestic in a form that forces political elites to become responsive to development agendas. And the reason that you had South Korea and Taiwan being developed is because political elites in the US made it part of their political priorities by mixing aid and trade in the way I suggested ... In the post-Cold War period we have a very different international environment, and in that environment there is no incentive for political elites at the international level to cut the developmental deal. And so that deal, that condition has to be constructed at the national level, and there has been a historical precedent for that as well, because if you want to understand the power of the domestic trade you have to understand the rise of social democracy in Western Europe, and you want to understand it particularly in Scandinavia, there it was the power of labour that condition political and economic elites to find a more inclusive political and social economic model for those societies. And for me the pluralisation of power is absolutely crucial in this context. And the question is: How do you pluralise power? How do you make elites uncertain, and it seems to me that there are two fundamental political features: one, collective mobilisation of citizens and that does not simply mean marching down the street and getting shot at. Collective mobilisation can take many other forms, but collective organisation is absolutely crucial because it gives citizens power, and secondly: elite contestation, elites must be divided for you to get power because when they are divided they are forced to look towards citizens ... elite contestation creates a context for that because it pluralises power and implicitly empowers that."

So two things are important in Zimbabwe's reconstruction:

"Organs of civil society that are mobilised and collectively organised, and secondly: the mechanisms to ensure that the political elite remain engaged and in contestation with each other. If you think development happens because you are going to get your man in

the presidential palace then you are seriously deluded. Development doesn't happen because of good guys and bad guys. It happens because power is pluralised so that whether it's your man in the job or somebody else's man in the job, by the balance of power they are constrained and conditioned to act in ways that are developmentally-oriented."

In conclusion, Habib noted that a divide has emerged between progressive nationalists on the one hand and liberal human right's activists on the other:

"Progressive nationalists in almost all of these contexts, Zimbabwe included, tend to focus on issues of system reform, issues of systematic injustice, of issues of land redistribution, of manipulation of the Security Council by imperial powers. They focus on that, and in the process they implicitly began to trade off issues like civil liberties, human rights and the defence of citizens. Liberal activism on the other hand, not always but in many cases has implicitly come to the defence of citizens, raised the banner of civil liberties, but have not been as explicit about issues of historical inequities, systemic contradictions, land reform, ownership of the nation's productive resources, etc. And it seems to me that as long as you do this trade-off you fundamentally erode both the human rights agenda and the developmental agenda itself. Foreign human rights activists in Zimbabwe have a role to engage in solidarity work that supports progressive and democratic activists on the ground. Only if this is done, and the divide bridged between progressive nationalists and liberal human rights activists; when we bridge the divide between developmental questions, and between historical inequities on the one hand and civic rights on the other, if we bridge the divide can the social force emerge both within the country and abroad for the realisation of sustainable reconstruction."

The analysis and recommendations included in this Policy Dialogue Report do not necessarily reflect the view of SALO or any of the donors or conference participants, but rather draw upon the major strands of discussion put forward at the event. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this document. The contents of the report are the sole responsibility of SALO, and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the donors who provided financial assistance for this policy dialogue session.

About the Southern African Liaison Office:



The Southern African Liaison Office (SALO) is a non-governmental organisation which promotes informed process and debate about regional conflicts and crises. SALO does this by organising dialogue events and forums for informed discussion amongst key government and civil society actors from South Africa, the SADC region and internationally, as well as through advocacy, documentary media production, and research and analysis.

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