



Liaison, Dialogue and Research

Reg no: 2006/020285/08

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Policy Brief

9 December 2021, Zoom Platform

Public Dialogue on the Security Situation in Mozambique

By Ineke Stemmet, SALO

SALO PUBLIC DIALOGUE: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
THURSDAY 09 DECEMBER 14:00 - 16:00
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LEILA CONSTANTINO
ECONOMIST



PETER BOFIN
ACLED



FOWZIA DAVIDS
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INEKE STEMMET
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CHAIR:
AMB KINGSLEY
MAMABOLO



Executive summary

On the 9th of December 2021, SALO, in partnership with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, hosted a public multi-stakeholder dialogue on the conflict in Northern Mozambique. The dialogue was chaired by Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo and speakers included Leila Constantino (Centre for Public Integrity in Mozambique) and Peter Boffin (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project). The dialogue was held to discuss the current situation in Mozambique, including responses from the region, implications for the region, the economic impact of the conflict and potential ways forward.

Context/ Importance of the Problem

The SADC Mission in Mozambique, dubbed SAMIM, was extended in October 2021 after its initial deployment in July 2021, with no conclusive deadline mentioned. The reason for the extension was: *“to continue with offensive operations against terrorists and violent extremism, to consolidate the stability of security and create a conducive environment for the resettlement of the population and facilitate humanitarian assistance, operations and sustainable development”*.¹

SAMIM and the independent Rwandan intervention have thus far yielded some promising military victories, including recapturing villages, dislodging terrorists from their bases, and seizing weapons and warfare material. Reports from SADC indicate that this has led to some relief in the violence, which has contributed to creating a relatively secure environment for safer passage of humanitarian support, and that citizens in Cabo Delgado have developed confidence in the interventions and are feeling more secure.²

Not only do these interventions have regional and international consequences and is adding to the complex situation with Rwanda and Tanzania respectively, but the humanitarian situation has also taken a turn for the worse. Food insecurity has worsened, some internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mozambique's Palma district were surviving by eating grass, wild fruit, and tubers, as hunger is taking its toll in the conflict-torn area.³

¹ Khoza, A. Sadc leaders extend deployment of troops in Mozambique. Times Live. 5 October 2021. Available: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2021-10-05-sadc-leaders-extend-deployment-of-troops-in-mozambique/>

² Southern African Development Community. 2021. SADC MISSION IN MOZAMBIQUE (SAMIM) IN BRIEF. 10 November. Available: <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief/>

³ Ndebele, L. 2021. Displaced people survive by eating grass amid discrimination in Mozambique. News24. December. Available: <https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/displaced-people-survive-by-eating-grass-amid-discrimination-in-mozambique-20211206> [30 March, 2022].

This is exacerbated by the fact that many IDPs are being discriminated against when it comes to aid in their host communities. The interventions and relative stability stemming from this have also allowed IDPs to start moving back to their locations of origin, which is further complicating the situation on the ground.⁴

Furthermore, a report by Human Rights Watch recently found that since 2018, insurgents have kept, kidnapped, and enslaved more than 600 women and girls in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province.⁵

The Economic and Social situation in Cabo Delgado

The ongoing conflict Cabo Delgado has destroyed public and private economic and social infrastructure. Leila Constantino explained that this has had a massive impact on communities and has caused a humanitarian emergency. She states that as we speak, the situation is worsening, due to a lack of financial aid. In response to this, the government of Mozambique decided to implement a short to medium term development and reconstruction plan that will be in effect from 2021 to 2024.

The Humanitarian Situation

The increasing displacements is causing a rise in the number of vulnerable people. The government has highlighted four groups of potentially vulnerable people – pregnant women, unaccompanied children, the elderly, and the disabled. According to Leila, these people are worse off because they are often unable to get food or shelter for themselves or engage in economic activity.

The government alone has not been able to respond to the crisis themselves and have asked for international aid. International humanitarian organisations have been active in the area since 2020 to help displaced people in resettlement centres and in the communities that host displaced people. The World Food Programme is the main humanitarian actor in the area and is currently facing a crisis. Their lack of funding has reduced the amount and frequency of food aid they are able to offer the people in Mozambique.

⁴ Cabo Delgado: Displaced people start returning home. 2021. Club of Mozambique. August. Available: <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/cabo-delgado-displaced-people-start-returning-home-the-new-times-rwanda-199945/>

⁵ Mozambique: Hundreds of Women, Girls Abducted. 2021. Human Rights Watch. December. Available <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/07/mozambique-hundreds-women-girls-abducted> [30 March, 2022].

Furthermore, the status of health and education in the area is precarious. People want their children to go to school, however, they are unable to take them to a school that is safe. Similarly, people are willing and eager to work to fend for themselves, but jobs are scarce.

Infrastructure Loss

The communities affected by the conflict have faced the destruction of many of the infrastructure in their towns. According to government data, 348 primary and eight secondary schools have been lost, there has been a loss in teachers and teaching materials, and two technical institutes were forced to close. 96 274 students from the different teaching subsystems are out of school in the area. 10 out of 131 health units have been destroyed, with 29 partially destroyed, and 39 vandalised. Many public administration buildings in Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Muidumbe, Macomia and Quissang have been either fully or partially destroyed.

Financial and economic

Between 2011 and 2016, the economic growth rate in Cabo Delgado was 6%. This growth came to a halt in 2017 when the conflict started. Using data from 2017 to 2020, the Centre for Public Integrity in Mozambique estimated the cost of the conflict, looking primarily at the defence sector, and the security and public order sector in the country. The annual growth rate for the former was 40,1% between 2012 and 2016 and 60,8% for the latter. Additionally, the contracting of public and private military companies has cost Mozambique 10 billion meticals. The accumulation of all these factors places the total cost of the conflict at 64,17 billion meticals – approximately 1,1 billion USD.

Reconstruction Plans

The *Cabo Delgado Reconstruction* of the government of Mozambique presents a set of strategic actions to rebuild the areas affected by the conflict and to attempt a quick return to normality in Cabo Delgado. The plan aims to address the above-mentioned humanitarian, economic and social issues to ensure that internally displaced people return to their areas of origin to live normal lives. This multi-sectoral plan thus requires interventions from the Departments of Health, Water and Sanitation, Energy, and Infrastructure. The government has already started to implement this plan. One of the activities is building resettlement centres. The government has committed to publishing monthly performance reports to monitor the program.

Additionally, the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) is also active in the area. Another entity active in the area is the Disaster Risk Management and Reduction Institute (INGD) which is a humanitarian institution in Mozambique that responds to disasters and emergencies.

The total amount that the government estimates to rebuild Cabo Delgado is \$190.2 million. This amount may change over time because there are some gaps in knowledge for some of the sectors – for example, the Department of Water and Sanitation has not come up with estimated costs.

The networks that support the insurgency in Cabo Delgado

Peter Boffin from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project structured his presentation around the regional nature of the conflict by firstly highlighting the external networks that support the insurgency. The centre of these networks is in the northern part of the region, however, there are also ties to South Africa in particular. A specific example of this is one man, Ahmed Muhammad Hassan, originally from Tanzania, who was recruited in South Africa into the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)⁶ and is currently a prominent leader in the DRC.

Collaboration between states on security and developmental issues

According to Boffin, the Rwandan military intervention has been the greatest in terms of personnel and arguably the most effective, at least in the short term. This effectiveness possibly indicates a set of complicated interests of the Rwandans in Mozambique, in Palma specifically.

Tanzania is also significant in their involvement in the SAMIM intervention and has contributed around one-third of the deployed personnel. It has a prominent role in the mission coordination mechanism, with the greatest number of representatives in that body after Mozambique. Of SADC countries, Tanzania is the most affected in terms of security and has experienced a few attacks in border areas. Its borders provide supportive networks for the insurgency and often act as a conduit connecting the theatre in northern Mozambique to groups and supportive networks across East Africa, the Great Lakes, and beyond.

Consequently, Rwanda and Tanzania have a shared interest in the happenings in Mozambique as they both face a significant threat from violent jihadist groups and networks in the region; groups that are adaptive, resilient, and operate across southern

⁶ Daghar, M., Chelin, R., & Haji, M. 2022. Expansion of the Allied Democratic Forces should worry East Africa. Institute for Security Studies. March. Available: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/expansion-of-the-allied-democratic-forces-should-worry-east-africa> [29 March 2022].

Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes.




Figure 1: Map of cross border traffic (Peter Boffin, ACLED 2022)

The darker arrows on the map indicate a quite intensive cross border traffic between Tanzania and Mozambique, between Kenya and Tanzania, into Burundi and then onwards into the DRC. These arrows illustrate, amongst others, the movement of the Islamic State – Central Africa Province (ISCAP) to recruit fighters and the networks that support the entity.

Tanzania has faced a real threat illustrated by the little dot that is Kibiti on the map, south of Dar Salaam, where it saw a nascent insurgency that followed the same patterns of pre-insurgency activity that took place in Cabo Delgado. The area experienced violent attacks between 2015 and 2017 which spilt over somewhat into Dar es Salaam. This violence was put down brutally and effectively by Tanzanian security forces. Consequently, fighters dispersed in two directions – south to Cabo Delgado and northwest into Burundi and on to the DRC.

Tanzania, Rwanda, and the rest of the region thus faces great risks because of the conflict. According to Boffin,

“No country in the region can risk northern Mozambique becoming another incubator for armed groups or a finance hub of expertise and recruitment - that is a threat to all countries in the region.”

Cooperation and tensions between African countries

On these security concerns, Rwanda and Tanzania’s interests are aligned which have been reflected in intense interactions in recent months between their security services at the highest level. This includes reciprocal visits between the respective chiefs of police and chiefs of defence forces as well as presidential statements and visits, most notably Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s visit to Kigali.⁷

It is unclear what the status of intelligence sharing between Mozambique and Tanzania is. There are agreements and mechanisms in place, but trust between the two countries has been low in recent years, arising from perceived interest in the insurgency. It is known, however, that intelligence sharing between Rwanda and Uganda is essentially non-existent given the long-standing tensions between the two countries. As such, Tanzania has a potential bridging role to play here, as both a member of SADC and the East African community and its strong presence in SAMIM.

Critique of policy options

- The Mozambican government has not clarified its plans for when the SAMIM forces withdraw.
- The long-lasting effects of the current reconstruction and development plans are unclear.
- The allocation of the state budget is not equitable among the provinces in Mozambique and the northern provinces suffer most from these inequalities.
- Corruption is a big challenge in Mozambique and if the government does not guarantee that corruption will not infiltrate the reconstruction plans and programs they might fail.

Policy Recommendations

⁷ Tanzania's President Samia Suluhu arrives in Rwanda for maiden visit. 2021. The East African. August. Available: <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-president-samia-suluhu-arrives-in-rwanda-3495308> [29 March 2022].

- The Mozambican government's commitment to publishing monthly performance reports on its reconstruction plan should be implemented effectively to track progress and keep the government accountable.
- The Mozambican government should clarify what its long-term programmes will be and what they wish to achieve in Cabo Delgado for longer-lasting peace and security.
- Through the proposed SADC Counterterrorism Centre, Tanzania's mediation role could potentially be solidified. For this to be effective there needs to be a recognition that the centre of the problem is toward East Africa and the Great Lakes. The diplomatic and civil society engagements around this should focus on the necessity of better interstate relations on professional security issues.
- Mozambique should create equity in budgeting allocations to all provinces so they can operate effectively and/or create their own projects specifically catered to their provincial population to address issues and ensure access to social services like health, education, and water in the same way as the southern provinces.
- Intelligence sharing between Southern African countries should be improved.

Questions and Comments from the Participants

- **Lwazi Somya (SALO):**
 - 1) Has there been a cost added to post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and who is willing to foot the bill within not only the regional actors but also international organisations such as the AU, the UN, and other international financial institutions?
 - 2) Is there a current *Disarmament, Deradicalisation and Reconstruction* (DDR) strategy towards demobilisation in Tanzania and the more northern countries? Is there some form of external (similar to Mozambique) intervention strategy that will stop the facilitation of extremists moving into the area?
- **Question from the chat:** Are the terrorist groups moving between the Great Lakes, East Africa, and southern Africa, utilising similar rules of organised transitional criminal networks? Or are these newly established routes?
- **Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo:** Do you think (the Mozambican reconstruction) plan is adequate?
- **Robin Hunter (Journalist from Zitamar):** Is the panel able to share any updates on plans for SADC's new counterterrorism centre in Tanzania?
- **Question from the chat:** What kind of post-conflict reconstruction is envisioned by the groups working on the ground? And does the state of Mozambique share some, if not all of these post-conflict reconstruction ideas?
- **Fowzia Davids:** I think it is Professor Thandika Mkandawire who coined the term of the "*clear and hold*" concept. I think if the military force or Defence Force manages to push the insurgency back from one area, and they manage to hold

that area for a while, then the insurgency just moves on to the next area. I think this is the cat and mouse dynamic in the fight against Al Shabaab by AMISOM in Somalia. How has Rwanda and SAMIM been tackling the insurgent groups in the north? Are they moving from one place to the next? Are they managing to break down structures within the different cells and in the insurgency?

- **Question from the chat:** Has the idea of a joint development plan for Mtwara, Cabo Delgado ever been suggested? One politician in Tanzania has suggested a Ruvuma Development Authority.
- **Piers Pigou (International Crisis Group):**
 - 1) What commitments are made in the plan to rebuild the social fabric, establish a dispute resolution capacity, and [foster] community dialogue, given that the leadership in so many communities have been ripped asunder in these areas? What emphasis is there on helping to rebuild some of those, with the caveat about concerns around some of the governance issues, which we know contributed to drivers of conflict? Is there any thinking around how those issues might be addressed in the Mozambican reconstruction plan?
 - 2) Could you say something about the culture of secrecy in the Tanzanian security forces and body politic around addressing these issues? Do we have a kind of combined secrecy of the Tanzanians and the Mozambicans who repeatedly promised to strengthen security and intelligence cooperation?
 - 3) I am curious about your thinking about what is going on in the mining and the land arena concerning some of these issues and how the plan may be addressing those head-on or sidestepping them?
 - 4) Do you have anything you could add about the Malawian dynamics that may be in play, given that there is also this connection into the DRC with Malawian troops deployed there?
- **Betty Makubu:** This is specific to Leila Constantino - Is there a plan specific for women and the girlchild, especially on a development basis?
- **Martino Chachiwa:** Can any of the panel update us on how serious the expansion of the attacks into Niassa province is?
- **Patrick Bond:**
 - 1) Many respected Mozambican and regional civil society groups have called for an end to what is '*blood methane*' an end to the blood methane war, but their voices are usually not heard. How do we get that perspective better represented here?
 - 2) Cyclone Kenneth's 225 kph devastation of Cabo Delgado in April 2019, and the global North (including South Africa's) failure to pay climate reparations to affected residents, plus corruption in the inadequate emergency relief operations are reasons the situation is so dire there. Fraught regional state development and repression will not work [as a developmental strategy] and a very different strategy is required. Not so?
- **Pardon Mawowa (SALO):** Are there any lessons that can be learned from the West African insurgent crisis that can help us understand as well as feed into getting solutions to solve the issues in Mozambique?

Answers and inputs from the panel:

Peter Boffin:

Research by the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime has presented substantial evidence that the insurgency has disrupted at least the drug trade through Cabo Delgado. It is no longer running through Cabo Delgado as much as it used to and has not fully been captured by the insurgents as a funding mechanism. Those sort of larger, organised criminal networks is not underpinning the funding for the insurgency. In our experience in Mtwara the networks that support border crossing by fighters and recruits from across the region are very intimate. It is small numbers of people travelling in twos or threes, staying in safe houses, and being ferried down to the river and guided across by local guides and local motorcycle taxi drivers.

The three borders marked on the map between Mtwara and Cabo Delgado and Kigoma and Burundi are heavily patrolled by the Tanzanian People's Defence Force, particularly since 2018. However, they have had limited success in stopping the flow of people. They are not getting great cooperation at the community level.

The insurgents are showing some resilience and can move and regroup at times. There is also the exceptionalism of Palma which indicates that it was the main objective of the Rwandan intervention to secure Palma, essentially to secure the LNG investments.

The public service in Tanzania is very disciplined in terms of information sharing and access. Building effective relationships anywhere in the public service takes a lot of trust and time but with the security stakes as it is, the sharing of information becomes limited even between security services at different levels.

Leila Constantino:

The Mozambican reconstruction plan is short- to medium-term. For this purpose, it seems to be adequate. However, the plan does not cover all the issues. It does not indicate what the plan is regarding security or governance, it only covers social and economic issues. In Mozambique, the government is an expert in making plans, however, this plan needs to be well implemented to achieve its goals and objectives for the population to safely return to their areas of origin. This should be monitored going forward.

The kind of post-conflict reconstruction that is taking place on the ground currently is trying to reconnect networks of communication, opening routes to re-establish water and sanitation networks and re-establishing electricity.

The Ruvuma Development Authority is not being widely discussed in Mozambique. It is quite a political issue, and it will be difficult to implement in Mozambique because there has been no exploration of gas in Cabo Delgado since it became a battlefield. It can take

more time to start talking about that and to see if it can be implemented in Mozambique. The main issue now is to guarantee security and the re-establishment of life in the affected districts.

There exists no plan from the government of Mozambique for women and girls in Cabo Delgado. There have been workshops for women, peace, and security in Mozambique, and some NPOs that advocate for women and girls' rights and gender issues are implementing some activities on the ground regarding this.

The Niassa attacks are worrying. Seven days ago, there was another attack in one of these districts that was also attacked in 2020. There is hope that the government will address or respond to these attacks so that it does not spread.

Social inclusion is needed in Cabo Delgado and the northern, central, and southern provinces. What have been heard from some people in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa is that people feel neglected and like their interests are not being addressed. Cabo Delgado has massive economic potential, but people are unable to participate in the exploration projects and companies

Mozambique has many plans, but the main issue is that these plans are not implemented effectively. After the cyclones in Mozambique, the government had a plan to respond to this, but the population indicated that these plans did not benefit them. Several people did not receive the subsidy and the money and shelter that the plan promised. Cyclone Idai and Kenneth are currently not being talked about in Mozambique - it has been swept under the rug and forgotten.

Conclusion

The dialogue highlighted the issues and concerns regarding the Mozambican government's response as well as the concerning regional dimensions of the conflict. At this stage there are still many unknowns, including the question of what will happen when the SAMIM and Rwandan troops eventually withdraw. Several grievances, including the marginalisation and alienation of the area by the Mozambican government, the people's inability to access the rich natural resource base in the country, corruption, unemployment, and accusations of human rights violations against the state need to be effectively addressed if a long-lasting situation of positive peace is to be achieved. There are opportunities for positive outcomes with the *Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan*, however a long-term plan that addresses humanitarian problems as well as security concerns and issues of governance is necessary. Tanzania's role as a regional peace mediator should be explored and if implemented well could be a positive step towards a solution of a worrying regional situation.


The analysis and recommendations included in this brief do not necessarily reflect the view of SALO or any of the donors or conference participants, but rather draw upon the major strands of discussion put forward at the event. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this document. The contents of the brief are the sole responsibility of SALO, and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the donors who provided financial assistance for this policy dialogue session.

About the Southern African Liaison Office:



The Southern African Liaison Office (SALO) is a South African-based not-for-profit civil society organisation which, through advocacy, dialogue, policy consensus and in-depth research and analysis, influences the

SALO would like to thank The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation for their direct support of this event



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